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[At the date of writing, the proposed amendments to the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1976 (NT) endorsing the transfer of customary 
ownership to the Northern Territory government in exchange for a 
re-grant of a sub-lease, had not yet been passed.  This article 
examines the rationalisations underlying this proposed change and 
the broader implications for customary ownership.  Individuated 
title cannot accurately encompass the cultural foundations of 
indigenous ownership because it is sourced in a different 
ontological perspective.  It is argued that the transformation of 
customary ownership into individual title will destroy its  unique 
communal foundation,  dislocate indigenous ‘tenants’ from their 
customary identity and produce a complex network of fractionalised 
interests.  It is argued that such a shift  is ultimately a retrograde 
step which, as experience in the United States and New Zealand  has 
clearly shown, cannot provide an economic solution for remote 
indigenous communities.]      
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Because our frame of reference takes itself to be the only way in which to 
conceive of something, it excludes other interpretations; because our 
conception of truth is one of universals and not simply varying portrayals, 
there is always to be an underlying referent.1 
 
The change to an individual title would throw the whole of our domain in a 
few years into the hands of a few persons.2 
 
To understand the cathedral one must see all of them.3 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article critically examines the justifications and consequences 
underlying the proposals to transform customary Australian native title 
into individualised private title.  
 
The proposal by the Northern Territory government to amend the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 
ALRA) and permit Aboriginal customary owners to issue perpetual leases 
over their townships to government entities who would then be entitled to 
sub-lease those townships back to the customary owners, represents a 
dramatic shift in policy and proprietary evolution for native title.4 The  
 
                                                 
1 B Bryan, ‘Property as Ontology: On Aboriginal and English Understandings of 
Ownership’ (2000) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 3 at 10. 
2 A memorial from the Creeks, Choctaws and Cherokees in 1888: Congressional 
Record, Jan 20, 781 from F S Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, first 
published 1941 (US Government Printing Office), 1945 4th printing at 21.  
3 A reference to the comments first raised in the classic discussion by G Calabresi 
and A D Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral’ (1972) 6 Harvard law Review 1089 where the authors at fn 2 
reiterate the idea that in order to understand Monet’s depiction of the Cathedral at 
Rouen, all of his Cathedral paintings must be viewed.  See G Hamilton, Claude 
Monet’s Paintings of Rouen Cathedral 1960, 4-5 and 19-20. 
4 At the time of writing, the Bill was before the Senate. Debate on the issue has 
been expedited. As noted by S Brennan, ‘Ideology makes for Dangerous Law’ 
Australian Policy Online, Posted 10.8.06 
http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=94490: ‘The 
government used the guillotine procedure to cut off debate in the lower house, 
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legislative scheme underlying the proposals effectively involves the 
‘reconfiguration’ of native title from an interest capable of embracing a 
culturally specific relationship with the land into an interest founded upon 
Western ownership ideology.5    
 
The proposed amendments may be briefly summarised as follows. The 
‘head-lease’ held by the government entity would take the form of a 
perpetual lease capable of being issued for periods of up to 99 years.6 The 
‘sub-lease’ given back to customary owners would be similar to other non-
freehold interests in the sense that it would exist for a limited period, as 
agreed upon by the parties, but shorter in duration than the head-lease.7 
The sub-lease would be governed in accordance with specific contractual 
and legislative regulations as is the case with other private leasehold 
interests. There would, however, be no obligation upon the government to 
‘consult’ with communities holding native title rights in the area prior to 
the issuing of the sub-lease, provided it is clear that the customary owners 
or their representatives have ‘agreed’ in principle to the shift.8 Rent 
payments for the ‘head-lease’ held by the government would be payable 
from the Aboriginal Benefits Trust.9  
 
These proposed amendments, if passed, would constitute a significant 
change to the existing legislation. Whilst the ALRA does enable interests 
or estates in land to be granted for residential, business and other purposes  
to Aboriginal people and to others, it is subject to Land Council consent 
and this practice has not been widespread.10 
                                                                                                               
after less than three hours. A Senate committee had a one day hearing and a few 
days to write a report. Government senators said the process was ‘totally 
inadequate’ and ‘such fundamentally important legislation should have bipartisan 
support with broad consensus among stakeholders affected.’  
5 For a more general discussion on the vision of property as a social creation see: 
M J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, 1992 at 151-156. 
See also K J Vandevelde, ‘The New Property Of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property’ (1980) 29 Buffalo Law Review 
325.  
6 This is set out in the proposed section 19A, ALRA. 
7 This is set out in the proposed section 19(4A) 
8 See proposed section 19A(14). 
9 See proposed section 19A(6),(8). 
10 See ALRA s19(2).  See also the discussion on private ownership of indigenous 
communal land in: The Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) 1976, 
Building on Land Rights for the Next Generation (The ‘Reeves Report) August, 
1998 : Appendix F. The report ultimately found that the ALRA had been effective 
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A number of rationalisations have been put forward to justify these 
developments. The primary one relates to economic well-being. It has 
been suggested that this type of shift is important because customary 
ownership is incapable of generating the same level of economic benefits 
that private ownership attracts.11 The individuated bundle of rights that 
private ownership encompasses, in particular its alienable status, is 
assumed to be more ‘efficient’ because the increasing resource value of 
land has simultaneously increased the benefits of authorised, marketable 
rights.12 
 
Supporting these assumptions, in April 2005 the Prime Minister John 
Howard stated: 
 
I believe there is a case for reviewing the whole issue of 
Aboriginal land title, in the sense of looking towards private 
recognition … I certainly believe that all Australians should be 
able to aspire to owning their own home and having their own 
business. Having the title to something is the key to your sense 
of individuality.13 
 
However, there has been concern about the effect such a fundamental shift 
in policy may have upon the cultural integrity of customary ownership and 
indigenous communities generally. Professor Mick Dodson has suggested 
that the proposals would eventually result in the removal of communal,  
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
in granting traditional Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory but that the costs 
had greatly exceeded the benefits.  
11 See for example the government comments in media releases where it is stated 
that these proposals will ‘make it significantly easier for individuals to own their 
own homes and establish businesses’ ( ‘Government to reform Aboriginal land 
rights’, The World Today, 31 May, 2006). See also the comments of researchers at 
the Centre for Independent Studies: in A New Deal for Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders in Remote Communities (Professor Helen Hughes and J Warin) 
who stated: ‘Private property rights in land are essential to attracting outside 
investment that is a pre-requisite to a major expansion in employment 
opportunities.’ See: http://www.cis.org.au/IssueAnalysis/ia54/IA54.pdf 
12 See especially H Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 
American Economic Review 347. 
13 Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Honourable John Howard MP, Doorstop 
interview, Wadeye, Northern Territory, 6 April 2005 at: 
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview1305.html 
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customary ownership.14 Noel Pearson has argued that the proposals may 
be a ‘trojan horse’ resulting in a further ‘taking away’ of land rights from 
Aboriginal people.15  
 
The 2005 Oxfam Australia report concluded that there was ‘no evidence to 
suggest that individual land ownership is either necessary or sufficient to 
increase economic development or housing construction.’16 In particular, 
the report noted that private ownership cannot effectively address the issue 
of housing and poverty needs for remote communities and that the ‘notion 
that land rights reform can be the main driver for economic development 
should be reconsidered in light of the legacy of disadvantage, cultural 
differences and structural factors faced by these communities.17 
 
This article argues that a shift from customary ownership to individuated 
title, such as the one proposed by the Northern Territory government, is a 
retrograde step for the social, cultural and economic well-being of 
indigenous communities. The amendments to the ALRA have been 
proposed on the understanding that such a shift will increase economic 
prosperity for indigenous communities and encourage greater resource 
management.18 However, it is suggested that the overall consequence of 
such a transition would be a ‘disaggregation’ of ‘the customary and 
communal elements of title’.19 In effect, customary ownership would 
become individualised leasehold title. The potential social and proprietary 
ramifications of this include: significant and rapid loss of traditional, 
customary lands, the creation of confusing and disparate tenures and the 
loss of an enduring collective identity, manifest through customary 
ownership and its protection of cultural continuity.  
 
                                                 
14 Land Rights Under Threat, Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation: 
http://www.antar.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=94&Ite
mid=104 
15 The Australian, 14 April, 2005. 
16 Land Rights and Development Reform in Remote Australia, Oxfam Australia, 
(2005), 5 (prepared by J Altman, C Linkhorn, J Clarke, B Fogary and K Napier). 
17 Ibid. See also the discussion on the Bill: Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (Bills Digest n. 158, 2005-06) 
18 See generally: S Bradfield, ‘White Picket Fence or Trojan Horse?’ The debate 
over Communal Ownership of Indigenous land and Individual Wealth Creation’ 
(2005) 3(3) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 1-10. 
19 M Tehan, ‘Co-existence of interests in land: A Dominant Feature of the 
Common Law’ (1997) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title: Issues Paper 
No. 12, Native Titles Research Unit, Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Studies.  
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The discussions in this article are divided into four sections. The first 
section examines the effect of title ‘individuation’ upon indigenous 
identity. Native title has been rationalised as a ‘recognition’ concept.20 
That is, it is articulated as a concept based upon acknowledgement, 
validation and continuation of traditional cultural practices.21  Those 
practices must accord with fundamental common law assumptions 
however, the proprietary status of native title is not based upon its 
similitude with tenured estates and the ‘bundle of rights’ they attract. 22  It 
is founded upon its position as an intercultural protective device.  In the 
words of Noel Pearson, native title is ‘the space between the two systems, 
where there is recognition.’23 
 
The transformation of native title from communal to individual would 
destroy its ‘recognition’ focus. As an individualised interest, native title 
would be reconceived in terms of proprietary rather than cultural status.24 
It would enter a completely different ownership paradigm where 
individualised rights and self-preservation replace cultural 
acknowledgement and collective benefit. 
 
One effect of this shift would be the ‘splintering’ of native title. 
Indigenous customs and traditions would be vulnerable to abuse, no longer 
nurtured under the protective umbrella of customary ownership. Native 
title would become an English property abstraction, created and regulated  
                                                 
20 See N Pearson, ‘The Concept of Native Title at Common Law’ in Galarrwuy 
Yunupingu (ed) Land is Our Life: Land Rights – Past, Present and Future (1997) 
150, 154 where the author argues that native Title is, for want of a better 
formulation the recognition space between the common law and the Aboriginal 
law.’ 
21 See the discussion by the Australian High Court in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 
ALR 258 at 264 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ) holding that the 
bundle of rights theory is an inadequate way of analysing customary ownership. 
See also K Barnett, ‘Western Australia v Ward: One Step Forward and Two Steps 
Back: Native Title and the Bundle of Rights Analysis’ [2000] 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 462. 
22 See Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 59. See also Dr Strelein, 
‘Conceptualising Native Title’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 95 and G Werther, 
Self-Determination in Western Democracies: Aboriginal Politics in Comparative 
Perspective (1992) 68-72. 
23 Above n.19 
24 The communal foundations of indigenous ownership is well established. Native 
American Indians perceived land ownership in terms of its use as ‘ecological 
cornucopia’ rather than ‘tradeable commodity’: W Cronon, Changes in the Land: 
Indians, Colonists and the Ecology of New England  (1983) 63. 
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by the common law rather than in accordance with the cultural processes 
reflective of time-honoured rights exercised by indigenous communities as 
a whole.  
 
The destruction of communal land interests would, in the long term, be 
highly injurious to indigenous communities. Removing the cohesive 
influence of customary ownership could produce a social engineering that, 
in the context of American Indians, has been described as akin to ‘legal 
cultural genocide.’25 
  
In the second section, the importance and utility of the ‘communal’ 
character of customary ownership is examined. It is argued that customary 
ownership is appropriately represented through shared, collective 
ownership. This reflects its cultural foundations.  In most instances, 
proving the continuation of customs and traditions dating back to pre-
sovereignty times is only possible through integrated community 
behaviour and protocol.26  Whilst the Mabo High Court did not rule out the 
possibility of customary ownership being held by an individual, this has 
certainly not been the norm.  
 
In the third section, the economic justifications underlying the shift to 
individuated title are explored. The fundamental notion, underpinning the 
individuation proposals is that a shift to private ownership will produce 
greater economic prosperity for indigenous communities.  This assumption 
is re-examined. It is argued that the assumed ‘efficiency’ benefits are 
based upon economic suppositions that do not respond to different cultural 
conceptions of ownership. Customary ownership is not inherently 
amenable to ‘resource’ classification. The economic assumptions that 
regard ‘private property’ as an evolutionary process consequent upon 
rising resource values, overlook the fact that property rights reflect 
complex social phenomena.27 Thus, ‘in circumstances of legal, normative  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See R Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and contemporary View of the 
Native American Experience (1986) 34 Kansas Law Review 713, 721. 
26 See P Sutton, Native Title in Australia: An Ethnographic Perspective (2003) 16 
where he discusses ‘post-classical’ cultural practices which have evolved since 
colonisation and which have regional and community characteristics. 
27 See generally the discussion in R C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How 
Neighbours Settle Disputes (1991).  
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and institutional pluralism, [private] property rights will not necessarily 
emerge when resource users calculate that the gains from internalization 
outweigh the costs.’28   
 
Customary, communal property is founded upon an established normative 
order that regulates the management of land resources co-operatively and 
internally. A shift to private ownership would destroy this collaborative, 
cultural governance without addressing the significant social, geographical 
and structural concerns facing indigenous communities within remote 
areas.29 
 
Finally, the article examines the experiences of other countries that have 
adopted title ‘individuation’ policies. The ‘allotment’ period within the 
United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is briefly 
explored as are the experiences of the Maori Land Court in New Zealand 
where, during the early settlement period, customary Maori ownership was 
routinely transferred into freehold title. The lessons that each of these 
jurisdictions provide is that the individuation of customary ownership is a 
product of a broader enframement process. The worldview that private 
ownership embodies, of land titles as items of wealth, consumption and 
exchange, threatens to displace the cultural integrity and cohesion of 
indigenous societies.30  
 
II  RECONCEIVING NATIVE TITLE AS INDIVIDUATED TITLE   
 
Put simply, title individuation refers to the process of transferring 
collective or communal land ownership into particularized, individual land 
grants. It is not a new concept. The early customary tenures that populated 
Scotland and Ireland were ‘individuated’ over the 16th and 17th centuries 
and replaced with fee-simple grants.31  This was, however, a product of the  
 
 
                                                 
28 D Fitzpatrick, ‘Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third 
World Tragedy of Contested Access’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 996, 1009. 
29 Oxfam Australia, Land Rights and development reform in remote Australia, 
(2005) (prepared by J Altman, C Linkhorn, J Clarke, B Fogary and K Napier) 5. 
30 See the general discussion of this by R Devlin, ‘When Legal Cultures Collide’ 
in M Asch (ed), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada (1997). 
31 See J M Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in 
England, 1720-1820 (1993); Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz, The 
Property Right Paradigm, (1973) 33 Journal of Economic History 16, 25
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imposition of feudal tenure and customary landholdings were repositioned 
to accommodate this framework.32   
 
The process of individuating indigenous customary indigenous ownership 
into common law estates is far more dislocative than the historical 
experiences of early brehon or manorial customary tenure.33 The 
individuation of native title applies the univocal framework of the 
common law to the normative traditions of indigenous communities. It 
reconfigures indigenous ownership despite irreconcilable cultural 
differences between the ‘ownership’ trajectories.34  Individuated title is the 
antithesis of a title representing the ‘intersection’ or ‘collision point’ 
between common law and indigenous ownership and the ‘beliefs, customs 
and laws of community’.35  
  
The relatively recent acceptance by the Australian High court of the 
validity of native, customary ownership has meant that Australia, unlike 
New Zealand or the United States, has had no history or experience with 
the transformation of indigenous ownership into freehold title. Pre-Mabo, 
native title had no independent proprietary existence therefore there was 
no need or impetus to consider title individuation.  
 
In the fourteen years since Mabo was handed down, the essential 
characteristics of native title have gradually taken shape.36 It has come to 
be accepted as fundamentally ‘non-private’ and ‘communitarian’.37 The  
 
                                                 
32 See S Dorsett, ‘Since Time Immemorial’ A Story of Common Law Jurisdiction, 
Native Title and the Case of Tanistry’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law 
Review 32. 
33 For a discussion of the experiences of early customary experiences see: P 
Goodrich, ‘Eating Law: Commons, Common Land, Common Law’ (1991) 12 
Journal of Legal History 246.  
34 For a further discussion of this process see: Noel Pearson, ‘Principles of 
Communal Native Title’ (2000) 5 Indigenous Law Bulletin 4; Peter Rush, ‘An 
Altered Jurisdiction: Corporeal Traces of Law’ (1997) 6 Griffith Law Review 144. 
35 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258 at 277 per Gummow J. 
36 For a discussion on the evolution of native title see generally: R Bartlett, ‘The 
Proprietary Nature of Native title’ (1998) 6 Australian Property Law Journal 77; 
R Bartlett ‘The Aboriginal Land Which May be Claimed at Common Law: The 
Implications of Mabo’ (1992) 22 Western Australian Law Review 272, N Bhuta, 
‘Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management’ (1998) 22 Melbourne 
University Law Review 24. 
37 See F Cohen ‘Original Indian Title’(1932) Minnesota Law Review 28; J W 
Harris, ‘Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference’ (1995) 111 
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connection with the land is established through communal traditions and 
practices rather than the individual expression of those traditions.38 Native 
title, as outlined by Dr Strelein: 
 
is not the sum of individual rights in law, nor can it normally be 
held individually. It has a different character. It is the right of a 
group that can be asserted outwardly. Collective rights of 
Indigenous peoples emerge from their distinct status, identity 
and history. Collective rights therefore have a special function 
… Collective rights are a sphere of authority and autonomy, 
capable of expression against the world.39 
 
Collective rights carry a special status within indigenous communities, not 
only because they reflect an established connection with the claimed land, 
but also because they express the unique and autonomous character of 
indigenous identity.40 Cultural identity is manifested through the mutual 
expression of traditions and beliefs rather than autonomous, self-directed 
rights.41  
 
In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) the Australian High Court rejected the 
notion that the native title held by the Meriam people amounted to a fee 
simple estate by virtue of their prior possession.42  As Professor Harris has  
 
                                                                                                               
Law Quarterly Review 421 for discussion on the nature and characteristics of 
communitarian and collective property as opposed to private property. See also L 
Strelein, ‘Conceptualising Native Title’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 95.   
38 This is discussed by J  Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Rights as Relationship’ in J 
Hard and  H Bauman (eds), Explorations in difference: Law, Culture, and Politics 
(1997) 56.  
39 ‘Conceptualising Native Title’above n.36 at  135. 
40 This is discussed generally by J E  Magnet, ‘Collective Rights, Cultural 
Autonomy and the Canadian State’ (1986-87) 32 McGill Law Journal 170 
especially at 176 where the author discusses the premise that individuals express 
themselves by being members of social groups and that in communities which 
enjoy ‘or seek collective rights’, participation is an indispensable condition for 
self-fulfillment. 
41 See J E Magnet, ‘Collective Rights, Cultural Autonomy and the Canadian State’ 
(1986) 32 McGill Law Journal 170 where the author discusses the importance of 
collective rights for Canadian minority groups and the need for them to be 
constitutionally protected. 
42 This argument was based upon that espoused by K McNeil, Common Law 
Aboriginal Title 1989. Toohey J was the only judge to support this argument: 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, 206-214. 
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noted, if native title had been expressed so that indigenous groups became 
joint tenants of a fee simple estate, the Meriam people would have 
acquired ‘joint property within the institution, not communitarian property 
recognised by the institution.’ 43  Thus, the validity and normative force of 
native title lies in its externalised status as a collective concept, dislocated 
from institutionalised proprietary assumptions. The social, spiritual and 
cultural bond shared by indigenous communities imbues native title with a 
distinctive and cohesive identity which is the ‘historical and logical 
oppositum of ownership by a single proprietor.’44 
 
The replacement of communitarian title with individual title would destroy 
the common law acknowledgement of cultural ‘otherness’. Native title 
exists in stark contrast to private property interests. Whilst the common 
law origins of native cannot be denied, it is unique because it amounts to a 
‘relationship between a community of indigenous people and the land, 
defined by reference to that community’s traditional laws and customs, 
which is the bridgehead to the common law.’45  
 
Thus, native title has come to represent much more than a bundle of land 
oriented rights.  It embodies the interface between indigenous tradition and 
the common law. Communal native title rights reflect broad notions of 
ownership and governance. The replacement of such an ‘integrative’ 
concept with structured, Eurocentric and highly ‘propertised’ titles would 
destroy this interface. It would shackle indigenous normative traditions to 
an institutionalised ownership spectrum.46  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 See J W Harris, ‘Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference?’ 
(1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 421, 436.  
44 See P Grossi, An Alternative to Private Property: Collective Property in the 
Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century (1981) (translated by L G 
Cochrane) 24. 
45 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258, 278. 
46 For a further discussion on the multi-dimensional spectrum of modern property 
frameworks see C B Macpherson, ‘Capitalism and the Changing Concept of 
Property’ in E Kamenka and R S Neale (eds), Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond 
(1975); K Gray and S Gray,’ The Idea of Property in Land’ in S Bright and J 
Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998).  
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III  CUSTOMARY OWNERSHIP AS A COMMUNAL CONCEPT 
 
When the proprietary concept of native title was first discussed by the 
Australian High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2], it was characterised 
as primarily communal in nature. Where a clan or group has continued to 
acknowledge laws and traditions dating back to pre-sovereignty, so that a 
traditional connection with the land has been substantially maintained, the 
court concluded that traditional communal title will endure.47 This is not to 
suggest that native title may never be held by a single claimant. Section 
223(1) of the Native Title Act (Cth) 1993 explicitly recognises that native 
title may include not only communal rights and interests, but group or 
individual rights or interests, provided they are in relation to land or 
waters.48  However at core, the common law concept of native title is a 
communal one. As explicated by Brennan J: 
 
[T]he people remain as an identifiable community, the 
members of whom are identified by one another as members 
of that community living under its laws and customs, the 
communal native title survives to be enjoyed by the members 
according to the rights and interests to which they are 
respectively entitled under the traditionally based laws and 
customs, as currently acknowledged and observed.  
 
Similarly, in Western Australia v Ward, the court noted that the critical 
feature of customary ownership is proof of a continuing connection with 
the land and it is not necessary ‘to spell out the personal or usufructuary 
rights of particular individuals within the community.’ 49 
 
In most instances, it is the community as a whole rather than individual 
members who are equipped to discharge the onerous burden of proof in a 
native title claim and establish the substantial maintenance of cultural 
traditions over claimed land. This is because indigenous customs are both 
constitutive and reflective of community practice.50  
 
 
                                                 
47 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 59. 
48 This was also confirmed in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community 
v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [33]. 
49 (2000) 99 FCR 316. 
50 See J Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Rights as Relationship’ in J Hart and R Bauman 
(eds), Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture and Politics (1996). 
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If customary ownership is transformed into private ownership, whether 
freehold or otherwise, this fundamental communal foundation would be 
extinguished. The private enforcement of land right rights, particularly the 
right to alienate, would fundamentally shift community structure and 
relations. Instead of land ownership being managed by reference to the 
collective interests of the indigenous group as a whole, it would become  
segmented. This would have a disjunctive effect on community 
relationships and, potentially, a devastating effect on cultural continuity.51  
 
The term ‘community’ has several different meanings for indigenous 
people. There are formal ‘geographical’ communities where the 
connection is based purely around mutual residence and the location of 
group members. There are also ‘interspersed communities’ where the 
connection is based upon cultural and spiritual attachment rather than 
geographical location.52 The latter form of community is coterminous with 
customary ownership because of its strong cultural foundations. Thus, 
customary ownership protects the relationship that members of a 
community, who may not necessarily have lived in that region, have with 
the claimed land.53 
 
By contrast, private ownership is spatial and physical in its application. It 
entitles the holder to exclusively possess the land because it is a ‘system of 
rules governing access to, and control of, materials resources.’54  
 
An indigenous holder of a private title would be entitled to carry out 
established customs and traditions, but only within the exclusively 
possessed area.  If the holder was a part of an interspersed community and 
did not reside in the area, he or she would have to either relocate or 
alienate to a third party. Enforcement of customary laws and traditions 
would not be possible in the absence of individualised control because  
 
                                                 
51 Ibid. See also the discussion on the distinction between private and non-private 
property by J W Harris, ‘Private and Non-Private Property: What is the 
Difference?’ (1995) 4 Law Quarterly Review 134.  
52 This distinction is discussed by P Sutton, Native Title in Australia (2003) 99. 
53 See also, M Tehan, ‘Co-existence of interests in land: A Dominant Feature of 
the Common Law’ (1997) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title: Issues Paper 
No. 12, Native Titles Research Unit, Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Studies.  
54 See the discussion by Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988) 
218-220 and C B Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property in C B Macpherson, 
(ed), Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions (1978.) 
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private ownership is organised around this central ‘exclusivity’ tenet and is 
not reconcilable with the detached processes associated with customary 
ownership.55  
 
Eventually, title individuation would fragment the communal foundation 
of customary ownership. Sections of individualised land would come to be 
exclusively controlled by individuals entitled to refuse access to other non 
-titled community members. The holistic interests of indigenous 
communities would be damaged by such fractionalisation.   It would 
impede the capacity of customary owners to practice enduring customs 
and traditions. Indigenous members holding individualised titles would be 
dislocated from community groups and their social identity would be 
redefined.56 
 
IV A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
It has been argued that communal, collective ownership cannot provide the 
economic prosperity that individuated title attracts.57  Customary title is 
fragmented amongst numerous community members and this ‘dissection’ 
reduces its potential utility as a ‘credit’ resource.58 Further, its inalienable 
status has meant that it cannot be treated as a transactional resource and is 
therefore excluded from a framework where exchange is the basic 
denomination.59   
                                                 
55 Waldron above n 52. 
56 This is examined by R Strickland, ‘The Genocidal Premise in Native American 
Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts’ (1998) 1 Journal of Gender Race 
and Justice 325 where the author concludes that American Indian law and policy 
is governed by a genocidal premise perceived to be humanitarian in nature.  
57 See H Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition 
Between Private and Collective Ownership’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 
653 where it is suggested that private ownership is inherently efficient. 
58 See the media release: ‘Land Systems holds us Back’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
7 December, 2004 where the ‘need to move away from communal land ownership 
and non-profit community businesses and take up home ownership, economic 
land development and profit-making businesses’ was raised by Warren Mundine 
(a member of the National Indigenous Council: see further Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/research/resourceguide/PDF_FILES/Current%20 
Debates%20Indigenous%20Land%20Tenure.pdf 
59 See the classic discussion by G Calabresi and A D Melamed, ‘Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard 
Law Review 1089, 1094 where the authors note that economic efficiency ‘asks for 
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Normative economic analysis suggests that common law legal rules should 
be efficient and promote ‘wealth maximization.’60 Thus, law-makers 
should choose the legal rule that maximises the ratio of benefits to costs 
and this is measured according to social ‘willingness-to-pay’.61  The 
perceived economic utility of privatised, alienable land title has a long 
history. William Blackstone concluded that the right to exclude is one of 
the most powerful features of ownership because it encourages effective 
resource development.62  
 
Classic economic theory supports this premise arguing that private 
ownership promotes wealth maximisation because it ‘evolves toward 
efficiency.’63 It encourages effective resource management and ‘cost-
justified fragmentation’ of land interests because these processes 
complement the self-interest of individual title holders.64  Thus, private 
ownership is perceived as stimulating efficient management, conservation, 
investment and conflict resolution over land.65  
                                                                                                               
that form of property, private or communal, which leads to the highest product for 
the effort of producing’. 
60 R A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1st ed, 1973); R.A Posner, 
"Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory," (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 
103; R A Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication’ (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 487; R A Posner, 
‘Wealth Maximization Revisited’ (1985) 2 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, 
and Public Policy 85; R A Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990). 
61 See R A Posner, ‘Wealth Maximisation Revisited’ above n 60, esp 100-102. 
62 Commentaries on the Laws of England, (first published, 1765), Bk II. 
Blackstone concluded that it is the private nature of ownership, the ‘despotic 
dominion’ which is ‘in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe’ which explains the ‘pains to till and work the earth.’ See also, Carol M 
Rose, ‘Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety Essay’ (1998-1999) 108 
Yale Law Journal 601; Carol M Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, 
Commerce and Inherently Public Property’ (1986) University of Chicago Law 
Review 711. 
63  See H Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) American 
Economic Review 347 and also T W Merrill, ‘Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis 
and the Evolution of Property Rights’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 331 for 
a re-evaluation of the Demsetz thesis. 
64 See the discussion by R Wade, ‘The Management of Common Property 
Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State 
Regulation’ (1987) 11 Cambridge Journal of Economics 95,102. 
65 It is argued that the rights ‘that give one person (the owner) the ability to 
exclude all other claimants to the resource’ is the most effective method of 
resolving resource conflict: See T W Merrill and H E Smith, ‘What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?’ (2001) Yale Law Journal 357, 374. 
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From a Western perspective, the primary economic impediment of 
customary title is its inalienable status. 66 This feature has, it is argued, 
retarded its economic progress.67  Communal, ‘non-private’ ownership, 
incapable of commodification is perceived to inevitably progress toward a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario, where ‘common’ land is improperly, 
and inefficiently managed and under-invested.68 
  
However, these are cultural perceptions. They stem from a dominant 
property ontology where ownership is conflated with wealth. It should not 
be forgotten that customary ownership has its own ontological 
imperatives. For indigenous Australians, land is not traditionally perceived 
as a commodity.69 It is a complex, inter-layered relationship where 
excludability and alienability are cultural externalities. Ownership for 
many indigenous communities is sourced in de-centralised concepts of 
kinship, welfare and identity.  Customs reflect community interest and 
social cohesion.70   
 
Economic models that predict outcome and measure efficiency cannot 
respond to customary ownership because of its fundamentally different 
cultural denotation. Indeed, economic revisionists such as Kaplow and 
Shavell, have argued that pluralist property cultures would be more 
appropriately embraced by broader economic models incorporating  
 
                                                 
66 This is discussed in the classic thesis by Calabresi and Melamed, ‘Property 
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 
Harvard Law Review 1089. 
67 The difficulties experienced by inalienable communal ownership were 
examinated by N K Komesar, Laws, Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and 
Demand of Rights (2001) where it is suggested that inalienability and 
fragmentation have constrained the capacity of common ownership to enforce title 
producing conflict and economic exclusion. See also R A Posner, Economic 
Analysis of the Law (6th ed, 2003) 32-34 where the economic consequences of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ is examined.   
68 See Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1234 reprinted 
in B Ackerman (ed), Economic Foundations of Property Law (1975) 2.  
69 See F Von Benda-Beckman, ‘Anthropological Approaches to Property Law and 
Economics’ (1995) 2 European Journal of Law and Economics 309 where 
anthropological rather than economic relationships between indigenous 
inhabitants and the land are discussed. 
70 See in particular the discussion by L Strelein, ‘Conceptualising Native Title’ 
(2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 95, 99 where the author states: ‘Native Title 
involves concepts that are not traditionally the domain of the Australian courts, 
such as collective rights, legal pluralism, and issues of competing sovereignty.’ 
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welfarism instead of cost-benefit analysis. These theorists suggest that 
courts and legislators should assume a diverse, welfare-oriented approach 
to title assessment. Wealth maximisation and economic benefit would not 
be entirely discounted within such an analysis but would becomes one of a 
range of factors where, in the language of Kaplow and Shavell, ‘notions of 
fairness become independent evaluative principles.’71 
 
The economic justifications that purportedly support a shift from 
customary to individualised ownership overlook the evolved pluralism of 
the Australian landscape and ‘lose sight’ of the ‘distinct boundaries’ 
between private and non-private ownership.72 Western private property 
may progress inevitably toward ‘efficiency’ within a society where it is 
viewed as an item of consumption but the same cultural conditions do not 
necessarily apply to ‘privatised’ customary ownership. The cultural 
boundaries between private and non-private property are fundamentally 
different.  In the words of Michael Heller: 
 
Conflating the economic language of entitlement with the 
language of property rights causes theorists to collapse 
inadvertently the boundaries of private [and non-private] 
property.73  
 
International experiences with title individuation policies have clearly 
revealed that ‘privatised’ customary ownership does not progress towards 
efficiency.74  There are a variety of reasons for this however the most 
obvious stems from cultural dislocation. Indigenous owners, unfamiliar 
and inexperienced with the alienation process, may rapidly dissipate 
private title to non-indigenous owners and dramatically reduce customary 
land holdings.75  
                                                 
71 Kaplow, Louis and Shavell ‘Fairness versus Welfare’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law 
Review 96. See also Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Governance Structures, Legal 
Systems, and the Concept of Law’ (2004) 79 Chicago-Kent Law Review 355.  
72 The boundaries inherent in private property are examined by M A Heller, ‘The 
Boundaries of Private Property’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1163 especially at 
1193. 
73 This is discussed by M A Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’ (1999) 
108 Yale Law Journal 1163, especially at 1194. 
74 See for example the discussion by J V Royster, ‘The Legacy of Allotment’ 
(1995) 27 Arizona State Law Journal 1, 3 where the author notes that the 
‘allotment policy was a failure. It did not transform the Indians into yeoman 
farmers, but it did wreak destruction within tribal communities.’ 
75 For example, in the United States, allotments made under the Dawes Act 
(General Allotment Act 1887 are estimated to have caused the loss of 
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This can produce a ‘checkerboard’ pattern of indigenous and non-
indigenous tenure and customary holdings over large tracts of land.  This, 
in turn has the effect of reducing overall title value, impeding cultural 
continuity over remaining customary ownership areas and accelerating 
community disintegration.76   
 
The land itself may be arid and inaccessible with little economic utility. 
Title individuation cannot change the physicality of the land and previous 
experience has revealed that individuation can do nothing to alter this 
indelible fact.  Historically, private banks have shown an inherent 
reluctance to provide credit for individualised customary title because of 
such physicality factors and also because of the fractionalised status of the 
title itself.77  
 
Customary land which is individualised invariably ends up being owned 
by multiple tenants in common, a position which can increase 
exponentially through successive inheritance.  Eventually, as evident in 
the American Indian experience, thousands of individual owners claim 
small, separate sections of land which were previously maintained 
holistically in accordance with community customs.78  These small 
segmented interests have little if any investment potential.79   
                                                                                                               
approximately 36.5 million hectares of Indian land prior to its repeal in 1934 
under the Indian Reorganisation Act. Much of this was a consequence of 
fraudulent, misunderstood or corrupt transactions: see Mazurek (ed), American 
Indian Law Deskbook (1998) 21.  
76 See especially J V Royster, ‘The Legacy of Allotment’ (1995) 27 Arizona State 
Law Journal 1. 
77 In the context of New Zealand, this is discussed by R Boast in 
‘Individualisation – An Idea Whose Time Came and Went: The New Zealand 
Experience’ a paper given at July 2006 Native Title Workshop, ‘Trends Toward 
Individual Title over Communal Lands: Implications For Resource Management 
and Sustainability’ University of Melbourne. He notes that the ‘hoped for benefits 
of individualisation … singularly failed to happen. Private banks proved very 
unwilling to lend money on the security of Maori freehold land, even though it 
was now a freehold and included within the Land Transfer system.’ 
78 In the United States many individual titles held under trust could not be 
alienated or partitioned compounding the problem. This was discussed by F 
Hoxie,  A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 
(1984) especially at 165.  
79 See M Lindo, ‘Youpee v Babbit – The Indian Land Inheritance Problem 
Revisited’ (1997) American Indian Law Review 223 at 225 where the author 
notes: ‘Due to problems created by multiple ownership of undivided interests in 
Indian trust land, such land has sometimes been all but abandoned.’ 
2006                                         Transforming Customary Title to Individual Title 81 
 
 
The need to ‘privatise’ communal ownership generally occurs, according 
to economic theory, when technical, population and other pressures strain 
the capacity of common resources and the need to ‘internalize 
externalities’ arises.80 The individuation of customary ownership does not 
fit within this paradigm. Cultural ‘externality’ is not a resource pressure. 
Economic models that assume a ‘commodity’ value for title ignore the 
importance of community, tradition and cultural continuity. Economic 
prosperity and well-being for indigenous communities is achievable 
without having to destroy the cultural nucleus of customary ownership. 
 
To justify the individuation of customary ownership on economic grounds 
is to enframe indigenous perspectives with Western ownership 
imperatives. These imperatives are not sourced in indigenous ontology and 
cannot respond intuitively to a framework where ownership is not 
perceived in terms of individualistic entitlement and wealth. Their 
application to the individuation process only serves to dislocate the 
cultural foundations of customary ownership. 
      
 
V LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
The experiences of title individuation in other countries provide valuable 
lessons for Australia. In most instances, the process has resulted in the 
devastation of customary ownership, the marginalisation of indigenous 
community members, the creation of splintered and complex private 
ownership patterns, an acceleration of the loss of customary lands to non-
indigenous holders and the obliteration of culturally specific ontological 
perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 H Demsetz, ‘Towards a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American 
Economic Review 347, 350-353. This theory has been challenged because it is 
argued that it ignores other factors such as government policies, market failures 
and individual preferences: see M A Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’ 
(1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1163, especially at 1194. See also D Fitzpatrick, 
‘Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of 
Contested Access’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 996.  
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A The United States 
During the 19th century, communal land reserves held by American 
Indians were ‘individuated’ under allotment legislation which eventually 
resulted in individual Indian allottees acquiring fee simple grants over the 
allotted land.81  
  
The allotment policy in the United States was based upon the assumption 
that 
 
individual ownership of property would turn the Indians from a 
savage, primitive, tribal way of life to a settled, agrarian, and 
civilised one. Assimilation was viewed as both humanitarian and 
inevitable. The cornerstone of this social engineering, this ‘legal 
cultural genocide’ was the replacement of tribal communal 
ownership of land with private property.82  
 
The United States experience clearly reveals the problems involved in the 
assumption that relationships with the land which are founded in 
indigenous cultural perspectives should be ‘reclassified’ and 
‘redistributed’ under individual titles .  
 
One of the enduring legacies of the allotment experience was that of 138 
million acres of Indian reservation land held in 1887, only 90 million acres 
remained by the end of the allotment program in 1934.83 As noted by the 
Meriam Report, a non- governmental study investigating the effect of 
Indian policy and administration on Indian life, loss of Indian landholdings 
occurred via the fragmentation of interests held under federal trusts and 
the loss of fee patents through fraud, corruption and financial destitution.84  
 
 
                                                 
81 See the General Allotment Act 1887 (US). Communal reservation land subject 
to an allotment was held by the public trustee for 25 years and was inalienable 
during this period. After the expiration of 25 years the land was transferred to 
individual allottees in fee simple. For an excellent overview of this see:  
82 See J V Royster, ‘The Legacy of Allotment’ (1995) 27 Arizona State Law 
Journal 1, 6. 
83 This is discussed by T L Anderson, Sovereignty Nations or Reservations? An 
Economic History of American Indians 1995 and see generally F E  Hoxie, A 
Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920, 1984. 
84 Institute for Government Research, The Problem of Indian Administration, (L. 
Meriam ed, 1928). Brief excerpts of the Meriam Report are reprinted in F P 
Prucha (ed), Documents of United States Indian Policy, (2nd ed,1990) 219-221. 
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One of the central features of the General Allotment Act was the fact that 
individual allottees received lands in fee however Congress held the 
allotted lands in trust for a period of twenty-five years.85 The purpose of 
this trust period was to enable the allottee to undergo ‘cultural 
assimilation’ and develop non-indigenous approaches to agriculture, 
Christianity and citizenship.86 At the expiration of the twenty-five year 
period the individual would receive an unencumbered patent in fee. Once 
the patent in fee was issued, the land could be alienated, encumbered and 
taxed.87  
 
The result of this was that upon the issuing of the fee patent, many 
thousands of Indians disposed of their land pursuant to voluntary or 
fraudulent sales or through resumption for non-payment of taxes or other 
government imposed liens.88 By 1934 two-thirds of all land allotted was 
owned by non-Indians.89  
 
Fee patented land was never restored to customary ownership. The vast 
majority of lands that passed into fee during the allotment period remain 
that way today and the enduring ‘legacy’ of allotment lies in the fact that 
customary, tribal ownership of lands acquired by non-Indians pursuant to 
the allotment programme has not been revived.90 Courts in the United 
States have held that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do 
not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe’ so that effectively,  
 
 
                                                 
85 General Alllotment Act, ch.119,s5,24 Stat.389 (1887). This is discussed by D S 
Otis, TheDawes Act and The Allotment of Indian Lands (F P Prucha (ed), 1973 
esp at 50. 
86 See D S Otis, above. 
87 The taxation of fee patents was examined by the court in County of Yakima 
Indian Nation (1992) 502, U.S. 251. 
88 See J A McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 
(1991) at 100-107. 
89 This is discussed by F S Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, first 
published 1941 (US Government Printing Office), 1945 4th printing at 216where 
the author notes: ‘Through the sales by the Government of fictitiously designated 
‘surplus’ lands; thought sales by allottees after the trust period had ended or been 
terminated by administrative act and through sales by the Government of heirship 
land, virtually mandatory under the allotment act: through these three methods the 
total of Indian landholdings has been cut from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 
48,000,000 acres in 1934.’ 
90 This is discussed by J V Royster, ‘The Legacy of Allotment’ (1995) 27 Arizona 
State Law Journal 1. 
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inherent sovereign powers of indigenous Indians were abrogated by the 
operation of the General Allotment Act.91 
 
B  New Zealand 
In New Zealand, Maori ownership has a very strong history of title 
individuation. Customary lands not coming within the application of the 
initial Native Land Acts in 1862 were investigated by the Land Court and, 
where approved, ownership was transformed into what came to be referred 
as ‘Maori freehold title’.92  
 
The Native Lands Act 1865 established the Native Land Court, now 
referred to as the Maori Land Court, which was introduced with the basic 
function of identifying valid Maori customary title and recording 
ownership and dealings in Maori Land. Section 6 of the Native Land Court 
Act 1865 set out that it was expedient to encourage the extinction of Maori 
proprietary customs and provide ‘for the conversion of such modes of 
ownership into titles derived from the Crown’. From this time onwards, 
the principal manner in which Maori customary title was extinguished was 
through the operation of the Court in investigating ownership and granting 
freehold titles.93  
 
The court had the power to identify the rightful customary owners of land 
and issue a certificate of title to the appropriate community, tribe or 
individual. This certificate of title could then, in turn, be exchanged for a 
Crown grant of freehold title.94 The title was issued in the form of an 
individualised estate and was given to individual indigenous owners as 
tenants in common. This meant that Maori title automatically became 
alienable. Purchasers could acquire an undivided share of an area of Maori 
freehold and partition orders were issued through the Native Land Court.95  
 
                                                 
91 Montana v United States (1981) 450 U.S. 544, 566 commenting on the effect of 
the decision in Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) 435 U.S. 191.  
92 See generally: F M Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, Revolution, 
Law and Legitimation, 1999 especially 166-186. 
93 This is set out in: Native Land Act 1862; Native Lands Act 1865 – currently 
outlined in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act ( Maori Land Act 1993), ss 6 and 17. 
94 Native Lands Act 1865 ss5 and 46. 
95 See the discussion by J Binney, ‘The Native Land court and the Maori 
Communities’ in J Binney, J Basset and E Olssen (eds) The People and the Land: 
Te Tangata me te whenua: An Illustrated History of New Zealand 1820-1920 
(1990), especially 140-146. 
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Thus, once Maori freehold was issued, settlers were able to negotiate a 
purchase of the land with individual Maori holders. Inevitably, this had a 
dramatic impact upon Maori landholdings. As discussed by Richard Boast: 
 
Titles were subject to constant attribution from the Crown’s 
land purchaser officers and from private buyers, creating 
attendant risks of costly partition hearings in the Native Land 
court and the need for fresh surveys….the immediate pressures 
of debt and poverty that confronted the Maori population in the 
second half of the nineteenth century were so pressing that there 
were strong incentives to sell at less than market values.96  
 
While on the face of it the Native Land Court appeared to promote the 
regulation of Maori customary title, the true purpose was the facilitation of 
settler purchases via the exchange of customary title for freehold title.97 
The preamble to the legislation setting up the Native Land Acts clearly 
stated that the policy of the act was to ‘encourage the extinction of such 
proprietary customs and to provide for the conversion of such modes of 
ownership into titles derived from the Crown.’98 Maori customary title was 
perceived as ownership only to the extent that it qualified the holder to 
apply for a tenured estate.99 Thus, the Native Land Court became ‘an 
inexorable mechanism for conversion of customary land into freehold 
land.’100 
  
Significantly, the process of individuating Maori customary ownership 
occurred despite the apparent legislative protection of their interests under 
section 4 of the Native Rights Act 1865 which read as follows: 
                                                 
96 From a paper given at the 2006 Native Title Workshop: ‘Trends Toward 
Individual Title Over Communal Lands: The Implications For Resource 
Management and Sustainability.’ The paper given by Richard Boast is titled: 
‘Individualisation – An Idea Whose Time Came, and Went: The New Zealand 
Experience’ and will be included within the forthcoming book: Buying The Land, 
Selling the Land: Governments and Maori Land in the North Island 1865-1921 to 
be published by Victoria University Press in 2006. 
97 See generally K Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (2nd ed, 1961) 238. See 
also more generally A Ward, A Show Of Justice: Racial Amalgamation in 
Nineteenth Century New Zealand (1973) especially 130-131. 
98 Preamble to the Native Lands Act 1865. 
99 For an excellent discussion on the impact of the common law on indigenous 
land rights see generally: R A Epstein, ‘Property Rights Claims of Indigenous 
Populations: The View from Common Law’ (1999) 31 University of Toledo Law 
Review 3. 
100 Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 at [45] per Elias CJ. 
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Every title to or interest in land over which the Native title 
shall not have been extinguished shall be determined 
according to the Ancient Custom and Usage of the Maori 
people so far as the same can be ascertained. 
 
Successive Maori land legislation contains similar ‘transfer’ provisions. 
Under the current Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, section 141(1)(b) sets 
out that where a vesting order has been registered with the District Land 
Registrar, customary title should be transformed into fee simple title in the 
same manner ‘as if the land had been granted to those persons by the 
Crown’. However, the legislation no longer makes this transformation 
automatic. Under section 132 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, Maori 
customary title will become freehold title where a vesting order is issued. 
It is possible, under section 131, for the Maori Land Court to issue an 
independent customary title declaration, however the combined effect of 
pre-emptive Crown purchases of land and the individuation of Maori 
customary title has meant that there is very little customary ownership left 
in New Zealand.101 
 
The individualisation of Maori title was initiated during a period when it 
complemented colonial land policy. Its ultimate effect has been 
unqualified. As noted by Richard Boast, ‘[t]he machine was allowed to run 
until there was nothing left to individualise; nor has the remaining stock of 
Maori freehold land ever been de-individualised at any time, and such a 
project would now be politically impossible in the face of owner 
opposition.’102  
 
Today, customary ownership in New Zealand is effectively non-existent. 
Recently, the New Zealand Court of appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati 
Apa considered whether Maori customary ownership existed over one of 
the few remaining coastal areas not previously acquired by either the 
Crown or non-indigenous owners.103 Whilst the court validated the 
continuation of customary Maori ownership where they had not been 
lawfully extinguished, this decision was subsequently overruled. The 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 sets out clearly in s13(1) that the ‘full  
 
                                                 
101 See generally: FM Brookfield, ‘Maori Customary title in Foreshore and 
Seabed’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 34 
102 See R Boast, ‘Individualisation – An Idea Whose Time Came, and Went: The 
New Zealand Experience’ above n 68. 
103 [2003] 3 NZLR 643. See also FM Brookfield, ‘Maori Customary Title In 
Foreshore and Seabed’ [2004] New Zealand Law Journal 34.  
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legal and beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and seabed is vested 
in the Crown, so that the public foreshore and seabed is held by the Crown 
as absolute property.’104  
 
This legislation has completed a process initiated during colonial times: 
the eradication of customary ownership. Subject only to the possibility of 
indigenous holders acquiring non-proprietary ‘customary orders’ under the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, the New Zealand land system is now, 
effectively, univocal.105 Title individuation of Maori customary ownership 
ultimately came to represent its complete destruction. 
  
VI CONCLUSIONS  
 
The proposals permitting individuation of customary ownership in the 
Northern Territory represent the first stage in a process of cultural and 
proprietary desecration, clearly apparent in the experiences of indigenous 
communities within other countries. If those experiences have taught us 
anything, it is that the solution to the significant problems of poverty and 
marginalisation facing indigenous communities do not lie in the 
subversion of customary ownership.  Title individuation policies within 
the United States and New Zealand have not improved economic 
conditions. Their primary effect has been the acceleration of land loss and 
the abolition of indigenous communities as ‘autonomous and integral 
sociopolitical entities.’106 
 
Australia must strive to uphold the validity of customary native title as a 
unique and fundamentally different cultural concept, founded on 
indigenous ‘recognition’ and sourced ‘in a set of understandings that 
remain past the ends of the outsiders’ fingertips.’107  The cathedral has  
 
                                                 
104 See also s14 (1) and for customary orders ss32-39. 
105 For a further discussion on this see: R Boast, ‘Maori Property Claims to the 
Foreshore and Seabed after Ngati Apa’ (2004) 21 New Zealand University Law 
Review 1 and for a discussion on the constitutional implications and the relevance 
of the Treaty of Waitangi see B V Harris, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi and the 
Constitutional Future of New Zealand’ (2005) 2 New Zealand Law Review 189. 
106 See S L Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes (1996) 5. See also W. 
Bradford, ‘ “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, 
Reconciliation and an American Indian Plea For Peace with Justice’ (2002) 27 
American Indian Law Review 1. 
107 B Bryan, ‘Property as Ontology: On Aboriginal and English Understandings of 
Ownership’ (2000) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 3, 10.  
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many standpoints, each as valid as the other.  The temptation to order 
indigenous perspectives to accord with the dictates of a different 
ownership framework must be avoided.  We have created room for native 
title, we must respect that space.   
 
